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REINVENTING THE EEOC
Nancy M. Modesitt*

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has struggled to be a meaningful force in eradicating employment discrimination
since its inception. The primary reasons for this are structural in nature.
The EEOC was designed to react to discrimination complaints by investigating and conciliating all of the thousands of complaints filed annually.
The EEOC has never been able to investigate all these complaints despite
using the vast majority of its resources attempting to do so. The devotion
of resources to managing and investigating the huge volume of complaints
prevents the EEOC from taking more effective steps to eliminate discrimination. This articleproposes a reinvention of the EEOC by making significant changes to the EEOC's organizationand responsibilities. I advocate
five fundamental changes. First, the EEOC should no longer be required
to accept and investigate all complaints of discrimination. Instead, it
should only investigate and litigate significant claims of discrimination.
Second, the threat of EEOC litigation must be given greater force by allowing the EEOC to collect attorneys' fees and fines from employers when
it prevails in litigation. Third, because its mediation program has been
quite effective, the EEOC should partnerwith the federal courts to provide
mediation in employment discrimination cases filed in federal court.
Fourth, the EEOC should increase its information-gatheringand analysis
activities to better understand and combat current trends in employment
discrimination. Finally, the EEOC needs to expand its discriminationprevention programs by providing significantly more information and training
to employers to assist them in complying with federal laws.
"The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and
expecting different results."
- Albert Einstein
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EEOC is an agency that has failed in its mission to eradicate

discrimination in the workplace. Even if its mission is impossible,
as there are those who would argue that discrimination cannot be
completely eliminated through existing legal systems,' the EEOC has
failed to reach its potential in reducing workplace discrimination. In the
early years of its existence, this was primarily blamed on its lack of power
to enforce the federal antidiscrimination laws; its roles were limited to
investigation and conciliation. 2 However, even after the EEOC obtained
authority to enforce federal antidiscrimination laws by bringing suit
against employers, 3 the EEOC has still struggled to be a major force in
ending workplace discrimination.
There are several ways in which the EEOC has not fulfilled its poten1. See Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives' Passion for the Unattainable,94
VA. L. REv. 495, 517 (2008) (book review) (noting that "racial equality for blacks and

other people of color is unattainable through law alone").
2. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why The EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672-73, 677 (2005) (discussing the congressional recognition of
the flaws in the initial structure of the EEOC).
3. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat.
103, 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000)).
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tial, including making missteps in its litigation department 4 and overcommitting resources to manage the intake of discrimination charges.5 In
addition, throughout much of its history, the EEOC has been hampered
by poor management and excessive turnover in its most senior positions.6
All these things have led to a significant credibility crisis, with the public
lacking confidence in the EEOC's abilities.7
Making the EEOC a force in eradicating employment discrimination
will require more than mere tinkering. This Article proposes a complete
restructuring of the EEOC to create an agency that focuses primarily on
preventing discrimination and, in circumstances where prevention has
failed, is structured to effectively enforce antidiscrimination laws. This
Article will proceed in two parts. Part I will explain the history of the
EEOC and the most significant reasons why the EEOC has failed to fulfill its potential. Part II will explain how the EEOC should be restructured, taking into account past problems with the EEOC and applying
modern governance theories to avoid recreating structural conditions that
have contributed to the failings of the EEOC.
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE EEOC
In order to understand why the EEOC has failed in its mission and how
it might effectively be restructured, the historical and current structure of
the EEOC must be understood.
A.

ORIGINAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE

EEOC

AND EARLY

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The EEOC was created as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Title
VII of the Act focused on employment discrimination and established the
EEOC as one of the federal agencies overseeing the implementation of
Title VII. 9 At its outset, the EEOC lacked any enforcement authority,
4. The most significant of these was the EEOC's decision under Clarence Thomas to
litigate every claim that its investigators believed to be meritorious. See Michael Selmi,
The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination
Law, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1996). The EEOC lacked the resources to litigate all such
cases, with the result that it devoted limited resources to cases that had no significant precedential value, monetary value, or even involved significant numbers of employees. Id. at
21-22, 37, 64; see also Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 684.
5. See Paul M. Igasaki, Doing the Best with What We Had: Building a More Effective
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission During the Clinton-Gore Administration, 17
LAB. LAW. 261, 266-67 (2001) (noting that well into the 1990s, the goal of managing the
intake and investigation of charges "took precedence over all [else]").
6. See infra Part I.D.
7. See Igasaki, supra note 5, at 263-64 (noting "serious doubts" about the effectiveness of the EEOC and a need to restore credibility to it); EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2009 CONhttp://www.eeoc.gov/planlarchives/
JUSTIFICATION 13 (2008),
BUDGET
GRESSIONAL
budgets/2000budget/2009budget.pdf [hereinafter 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION] (2007 survey of the public found that only 47.8% of the public "had confidence in EEOC's ability to
enforce federal equal employment [opportunity] laws").
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006)).
9. Id. at 258-59.
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being limited in its authority to investigating and engaging in conciliation
efforts with employers.10 The EEOC lacked the power to bring suit; this
authority was vested in the Attorney General." The primary focus for
the EEOC appeared to have been the investigation and conciliation of
employment discrimination claims. 12 The EEOC was not given subpoena
power or the power to sanction employers whom it found had engaged in
discrimination.' 3
This complete absence of enforcement authority was partially remedied by the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.14
The Act gave the EEOC the authority to bring suit on behalf of employees as well as the power to bring suit on its own when lacking an employee-plaintiff.' 5 Other than these significant changes,16 the EEOC's
powers and structural responsibilities have remained substantially the
same,17 except as to the coverage of the anti-discrimination laws. While
its role is the same, the coverage of federal antidiscrimination laws has
expanded, and the EEOC now handles claims not only for the original
coverage of Title VII18 but also for age discrimination,1 9 disability discrimination, 20 and genetic discrimination claims. 21
B.

INVESTIGATIVE

ROLE

BECOMES ALL-CONSUMING INTAKE

UNIT ROLE

The initial role of the EEOC was supposed to involve investigating and
conciliating claims of employment discrimination. 2 2 However, from the
beginning, the primary role of the EEOC has in fact been to process
claims (charges) of employment discrimination rather than investigate or
10. Id.
11. Id. § 705.
12. This appears evident from the level of attention in the legislation devoted to the
EEOC's role in investigation and conciliation. While the other roles of the EEOC were
merely identified, the process of investigation and conciliation was spelled out in detail.
Compare id. § 705, with id. §§ 700-10.
13. See id. §§ 710, 713.
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103,
104-05 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006)).
15. Id.
16. One other additional responsibility that the EEOC obtained from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was the responsibility for handling federal employee
claims of discrimination. See id. The role of the EEOC with respect to these claims is
radically different than for claims by private-sector employees and is not the focus of this
Article.
17. As discussed infra Part I.E.2, the EEOC did subsequently gain responsibility for
developing a training program, but this training program consumes a tiny amount of the
EEOC's budget and organization in relation to the EEOC's other responsibilities.
18. Race, sex, color, national origin, and religion. Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 § 10.
19. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
20. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2006).
21. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881, 914.
22. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand On Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1135-36 (1989).
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conciliate them. 23 The reality of the EEOC as an intake and processing
unit, rather than an investigative unit, began at its inception. 24 Congress
greatly underestimated the number of charges that the EEOC would receive; thus, it lacked adequate resources to investigate all the charges and
quickly found itself with a huge backlog of charges, 25 making effective
investigation of the charges impossible. As a 1976 General Accounting
Office report noted, most charges filed with the EEOC were not actually
investigated. 26 Rather than full investigation of each charge, the EEOC
was accepting the charges but ultimately closing out nearly half of all
charges administratively. 27 Less than forty percent of all charges resulted
in an EEOC determination as to whether discrimination had occurred. 28
The investigations that did take place were marred by a lack of expertise
among the investigators, 2 9 and the agency was plagued with poor management, 30 which likely contributed to the reality of the EEOC accepting
and processing charges of discrimination rather than effectively investigating them. 3 1
Over the decades since the establishment of the EEOC, the backlog of
charges from private sector employees has ebbed and flowed, but has
never been eliminated. 32 This backlog of charges has continued to keep
the EEOC in the position where it is treading water-managing the huge
number of claims without substantively investigating them.3 3 In 1968, the
average processing time for charges was sixteen months. 34 By 1977, five
years after the expansion of Title VII to cover federal, state, and local
government employees, there was a backlog of 94,700 charges for private
sector employees, and the average processing time for charges was thirtytwo months.3 5
Against the background of a huge volume of charges and significant lag
time between charge initiation and closure, the idea of investigating each
charge was abandoned, and the EEOC began its first programmed efforts
23. See Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigmfor EEOC Enforcement After
35 Years: Outsourcing ChargeProcessingby Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305,
309-310, 326 (2001).
24. Id. at 326-27; Rose, supra note 22, at 1136-37.
25. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1136; Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 673-75.
26. U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,

H.R. Doc. No. 76-147, at 10-11 (1976).
27. See id. at 10-12.
28. Id.
29. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1136-37; Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 673-74.
30. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 674 (noting the excessive turnover at the
highest levels of the EEOC as well as an internal memorandum from 1967 noting poor
management).
31. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1136-37. Another factor in preventing the EEOC from
effectively investigating charges throughout its history has been a lack of sufficient funding.
See Green, supra note 23, at 346-50 ("Efforts by Congress to use its power in the appointment and funding process to stymie the EEOC are well known.").
32. See Green, supra note 23, at 310-11.
33. Id.
34. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 675.
35. Id. at 677-78.
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to reduce the charge backlog.36 This did in fact reduce the charge backlog without eliminating it, 3 7 but the backlog expanded again in the 1980s
and 1990s, 38 in part due to a reversion in the 1980s to a goal of full investigations of all charges rather than using a prioritization system to determine which charges should be given more attention. 39
By the mid-1990s, the pendulum had once again swung away from full
investigation of all charges and toward another programmed effort to reduce the backlog of charges. 40 It was during this time that the EEOC's
current system developed. Since that time, charges have been categorized
as A, B, or C as follows: A charges are those that appear to the EEOC to
very likely indicate that the law has been violated and that indicate systemic discrimination. 41 B charges might involve a violation of federal antidiscrimination laws but typically require more investigation. 42 C
charges clearly show a lack of merit or sometimes a lack of jurisdiction. 43
The category into which a charge is classified determines its fate. 44 A
charges receive a full investigation, with a determination of whether "reasonable cause" 45 exists to believe discrimination occurred. 46 If reasonable cause is found, then the EEOC undertakes to conciliate the matter by
negotiating with the employer. 4 7 If conciliation fails, then the EEOC
may litigate the claim. 48 The EEOC attempts to resolve B charges via
mediation. 49 If that resolution fails, either because the parties refuse to
mediate or the mediation is unsuccessful, then the B charge is sent
36. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1150.
37. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 2, at 681.

38. See End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC to Face New Challenges, EEOC, http://
eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1980s/end.html (last visited July 21, 2010) [hereinafter The
1980s] (noting backlog increased in the 1980s); New Enforcement Strategies to Address Discrimination in the Changing Workplace, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/
newenforcement.html (last visited July 21, 2010) [hereinafter The 1990s] (noting backlog
increased in the 1990s before the charge handling policy was revised).
39. See The 1980s, supra note 38 (noting change in charge handling policy in the
1980s).
40. See The 1990s, supra note 38 (noting new charge handling policy implemented to
reduce backlog).
41. Green, supra note 23, at 327.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-059, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: SHARING PROMISING PRACTICES AND FULLY IMPLEMENTING
STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING CAN IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF GROWING WORKLOAD 18 (2008) [hereinafter EEOC: PROMISING PRACTICES].
45. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES To KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 171-74 (2000), http://

www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/pdf/promises.pdf.
46. Under its National Enforcement Plan, to the extent that resources permit, the
EEOC will investigate charges that do not involve systemic discrimination but where "it

appears more likely than not that discrimination has occurred." See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN, VIII.A, http://
eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/nep.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
47. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 45, at 171-74.
48. See id.
49. See EEOC: PROMISING PRACTICES, supra note 44, at 18.
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through the A charge process.5 0 The charges where the EEOC determines that either it lacks jurisdiction or appear to be unsupported are
categorized as C charges and dismissed without investigation. 5'
By 2001, this program for managing charges reduced the backlog to
approximately 32,000 charges and the processing time to just over six
months. 52 However, these gains were short-lived. Between 2004 and
2007, the charge inventory grew again. 53 In this timeframe, the average
amount of time needed to close a charge increased by 34 days-from 171
days to 205 days. 54 During fiscal year (FY) 2007, the EEOC had 127,710
charges pending in the private sector.5 5 The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found two primary reasons for the increased backlog of
charges: (1) a decrease in the number of EEOC investigators and (2) an
increase in the proportion of A and B charges, which are more resource
intensive than C charges. 56 While there was an increase in the number of
mediations during this time (approximately five percent), the relative
proportion of mediations compared to the remainder of the charges remained stable.5 7 In its most recent report, for FY 2008, the EEOC notes
that one of its greatest challenges is reducing the immense inventory of
charges, which stands at approximately 75,000.58
The EEOC itself recognizes that what can be termed its "intake role,"
that is, its charge-handling obligations, has taken over the agency. 59 In a
recent budget justification, the section entitled "Chair's Priorities" begins
with the statement that the "EEOC is first and foremost an enforcement
agency responsible for accepting charges of employment discrimination
from members of the public." 60 In its Annual Report, the EEOC notes
that charge processing is "its most important and resource-intensive activity." 6 1 To fulfill its primary role as intake unit, the EEOC's first-listed
priority is to hire staff to handle the growing volume of filed charges. 62
The budget numbers confirm these statements of commitment to the
intake role. For FY 2008, the EEOC spent just over $270 million on pri50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See EEOC, COMBINED ANNUAL REPORTS FISCAL YEARS 1999-2001 (OCTOBER 1,
1998, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2001), Private Sector Enforcement Highlights, http://
archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/annual-reports/annrep99-01.html#enforcement

(last

visited

Oct. 18, 2010).
53. See EEOC: PROMISING PRACTICES, supra note 44, at 23.
54. Id. at 23, 29.
55. Id. at 24. This number includes charges filed during FY 2007, 85,509, as well as
charges that were not closed from previous years. Id. at 24-25.

56. Id. at 26-27.
57. Id. at 31.
58. See EEOC, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 42 (2008),
http://archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2008/par2008.pdf [hereinafter 2008 REPORT].
59. See 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 3.

60. Id.
61. 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 42.
62. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 3.
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vate sector enforcement of federal antidiscrimination laws. 6 3 Of this $270
million, approximately $162 million was spent on administrative charge
processing.64 This made its intake role responsible for more than half
(sixty percent) of its total private sector enforcement budget. 65 This percentage of total enforcement budget has remained remarkably consistent
in recent years. 66
Even as the EEOC devotes huge resources toward its intake role, the
value of this service has been questionable. Professor Selmi posits that,
in essence, the EEOC's intake role has made it an expensive and cumbersome processer of discrimination claims, "a large number of ... [which it]
determines have no merit." 67 In addition, he argues, the EEOC's intake
role may produce a net detriment by deterring private attorneys from
taking some cases. 68 By giving individuals the (inaccurate) perception
that the EEOC will handle all charges of discrimination, 69 the EEOC potentially reduces the likelihood that the individual will obtain representation with an attorney. 70 If the EEOC then issues a "no-cause"
determination,7 1 the individual is left with no remedy from the EEOC
and a claim that private attorneys may not want to pursue, with the result
that some meritorious claims will be lost. 7 2
By perceiving its primary role as an intake unit and devoting a huge
percentage of its resources to that function, the EEOC overcommits resources to managing the intake of such claims. 73 Processing claims does
not reduce discrimination in the workplace. This quasi-enforcement role
of the EEOC must be eliminated.
C.

LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF LITIGATION ROLE IN ENFORCING
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS

While the EEOC spends far too much of its resources on its role as an
63. See EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2010 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 12
(2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2010budget.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2010)
[hereinafter 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION].
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 17 (for FY 2007, total private
sector enforcement budget of just under $270 million; administrative charge processing
budget of about $161 million); EEOC, FISCAL YEAR 2008 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION § II.A (2007), http://archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/2008budget/index.html#Table2 [hereinafter 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION] (for FY 2006, total private sector
enforcement budget of nearly $268 million; administrative charge processing budget of
about $157 million); EEOC, FY 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET § III.A (2006), http://
archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/2007budget/index.html#Table2 [hereinafter 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET] (for FY 2005, total private sector enforcement budget of about $265
million; administrative charge budget of nearly $177 million).
67. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 22, 64.
68. Id. at 44.
69. See id at 57.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id. at 43-44.
73. See Igasaki, supra note 5, at 266-67.
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intake unit, this is not its only responsibility. 74 In addition to its powers
of investigation and its responsibility of engaging in conciliation efforts as
ways of reducing discrimination, the EEOC does have other enforcement
powers.7 5 Unlike other federal agencies, 7 6 the EEOC is not able to directly sanction employers who violate the federal laws it is charged with
administering.77 Instead, the EEOC is limited to more indirect enforcement efforts. Its strongest enforcement power is the EEOC's ability to
bring suit against an employer on behalf of an individual or class of individuals.78 In addition, the EEOC uses softer techniques, such as information gathering via the EEO-1 reports, 79 as well as its investigative powers,
to obtain evidence about violations of law that it can then seek to remediate via lawsuit or conciliation with an employer.8 0 While the EEOC's
investigative power might seem significant, it is substantially limited because it can only subpoena documents when a charge of discrimination
has been filed.8 1
Because the EEOC's enforcement powers are limited, 82 it is critical for
the EEOC to effectively wield them. However, the effectiveness of the
EEOC's use of its most obvious direct enforcement power, litigation, has
been severely limited.8 3 There are three different aspects to the EEOC's
ineffective use of litigation as an enforcement tool: (1) the litigation program has been relatively small in scale; 84 (2) there are indications that the
EEOC's litigation program has had little impact;8 5 and (3) given the huge
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
75. See id.
76. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for instance, has the authority to investigate and impose sanctions on employers for violating federal employee safety
laws. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-658 (2006).

77. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
79. The EEO-1 reports must be filed annually by all employers who have at least 100
employees, or are a federal contractor with at least 50 employees and a contract of $50,000
or more. The report provides information about the race, sex, and ethnicity of employees
in each of the employer's job categories. See EEOC, ANSWERS To EEO-1 FILING QUESTIONS OFTEN ASKED BY EMPLOYERS, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeolsurvey/faq.cfm

(last visited Aug. 3, 2010). The EEOC is empowered directly by statute to require employers to provide reports to it as are "reasonable, necessary, or appropriate" to enforcing Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8.
80. See id.
81. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 65 (1984) ("In construing the EEOC's
authority to request judicial enforcement of its subpoenas, we must strive to give effect to

Congress' purpose in establishing a linkage between the Commission's investigatory power
and charges of discrimination. If the EEOC were able to insist that an employer obey a
subpoena despite the failure of the complainant to file a valid charge, Congress' desire to
prevent the Commission from exercising unconstrained investigative authority would be
thwarted.")
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
83. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-HRD-93-30; EEOC: AN
OVERVIEW 12 (1993) (statement of Linda G. Morra, Dir. Educ. & Emp. Issues, Human
Resources Div.), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d45tl5/149741.pdf.
84. See 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 63, at 12.
85. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 50-51; EEOC: AN OVERVIEw, supra note 83, at 12

(commenting that in the 1990s, the EEOC litigated less than 1% of the charges that it
investigated).
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number of cases brought by private attorneys, one queries whether the
EEOC's small litigation program makes any significant incremental differences in promoting a discrimination-free workplace. 86
First, the EEOC's litigation program has historically been much
smaller in scale than its intake efforts and remains so even today.8 7 For
FY 2008, the litigation program received less than one-third the funding
that the EEOC allotted to its intake role, with $162 million budgeted for
administrative charge processing and only $57 million for its litigation
program.88 In FY 2007, the numbers were nearly the same. 89 The EEOC
budgeted $161,259,000 for its administrative charge processing efforts and
$56,223,000 for litigation, which gave litigation barely one-third the funding of administrative charge processing. 90
Second, the impact of the EEOC's litigation efforts has been at best
mixed. In the early years of Title VII, the EEOC did not even have the
authority to bring suit. 91 That power lay with the Department of Justice,
which brought several major lawsuits that resulted in significant consent
decrees. 92 And once the EEOC obtained authority to bring suit, it focused on individual claims rather than class actions or cases involving systemic discrimination. 93 In the years after obtaining the power to bring
suit, the EEOC litigated only a tiny proportion of cases that it was unable
to resolve by conciliation. 94 This continued even into the 1990s, where a
GAO report indicated that the EEOC litigated less than one percent of
the charges that it investigated.9 5 In the years following the EEOC gaining the power to bring suit, the EEOC initiated only one case using its
power to bring suit directly (via a commission charge rather than relying
on an individually filed charge). 96 And the number of litigated cases has
decreased in recent years.9 7 In 1989, the EEOC was involved in 599 law86. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 52, 64 (suggesting that a private system would be more
effective).
87. See EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12 (noting that the EEOC processed
over 68,000 claims in FY 1992 but only litigated 447); 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra
note 63, at 12 (for FY 2010, the EEOC requested about $200 million for administrative
charge processing and only about $60 million for litigation).
88. See 2010 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 63, at 12.
89. See 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, at 17.

90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See

id.
Rose, supra note 22, at 1135.
id. at 1145 (discussing lawsuits involving the steel and trucking industries).
id. at 1149-1151 (noting that in the 1970s, the focus was on individual claims,

and as of 1981, the EEOC had filed only one suit involving systemic discrimination).

94. Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUs. REL. L.J. 1,
60 (1977).
95. See EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12.

96. Hill, supra note 94, at 61.
97. Compare Mary Kathryn Lynch, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:
Comments on the Agency and Its Role in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 20 GA. J. INT'L
& Comp. L. 89,99 (1990), with EEOC, EEOC LrrlGATION STATISTIcs, FY 1997 THROUGH
FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Sept.

10, 2010).
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suits, either by bringing suit or intervening in the litigation.9 8 By 2009,
that number had dropped to 314.99 As to adverse impact claims, no such
claims were brought by the EEOC during the majority of the 1980s,
which was apparently due to the political beliefs of then-Commissioner
Clarence Thomas.1 00 It was not until the 1990s that the EEOC began to
critically examine its litigation efforts in an attempt to have a significant
impact on discrimination and "deter discrimination beyond the litigants
in any one case."10 1
Furthermore, what limited success the EEOC enjoyed in its early litigation efforts102 was devalued by notable cases where the EEOC was sanctioned for its litigation efforts. In its first systemic discrimination case,
the EEOC mismanaged the litigation by allowing an attorney with significant ties to an outside organization (the National Organization for Women) to manage the case, to the point that the district court found that
the EEOC's attorney had a serious conflict of interest.103 In commenting
on the EEOC's litigation, which involved several different lawsuits filed
against Sears, one judge stated: "This Court is impressed with Sears' contention that the EEOC has engaged in a pattern of misconduct over the
past six years which amounts to a display of general 'bad faith' on behalf
of the EEOC sufficient to warrant dismissal of this cause."1 04
Other litigation efforts around this time also resulted in sanctions
against the EEOC. For example, the EEOC was found to have brought a
class action in bad faith in EEOC v. Datapoint Corp. 0 5 and was sanctioned by the court, which awarded attorneys' fees in excess of $66,000 to
the employer. 106 Another court, in awarding attorneys' fees to an employer, considered the EEOC's prosecution of a meritless claim so bad as
to be "poison of bad faith."1 07 An EEOC attorney was fined $500 for
filing a class action claim without an actual employee or applicant on
whose basis the suit was brought.108 More recently, in 2010, the EEOC
was ordered to pay almost $4.5 million in attorneys' fees to a trucking
company it had sued on behalf of female drivers whom the EEOC
claimed had been sexually harassed.109 The judge justified the award by
noting that the EEOC's actions were "unreasonable" and suggested that
98. See Lynch, supra note 97, at 99.
99. See EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, supra note 97.

100. See Rose, supra note 22, at 1158-59 (discussing the lack of adverse impact cases
from 1983-89 and then-Chairman Thomas's objections to adverse impact claims).
101. See Igasaki,supra note 5, at 262, 265-66, 268 (describing the development of a task
force to redefine the litigation, and other, efforts of the EEOC).
102. Former Commissioner Paul Igasaki referred to the EEOC's litigation efforts
before the 1990s as "uneven" and being of "limited scope." Igasaki, supra note 5, at 264.
103. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 249-50 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
104. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1253-54 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
105. 457 F. Supp. 62, 68 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
106. Id. at 69.
107. EEOC v. Shoney's, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 332, 337 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
108. EEOC v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 665 F. Supp. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
109. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2010 WL 520564, at *20
(N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2010).
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the EEOC's conduct in the case was motivated by a desire to obtain media coverage. 110 These types of missteps hamper the EEOC's litigation
efforts by damaging the EEOC's reputation, creating an incentive for employees to prefer private lawyers and for employers to resist settlement
and conciliation efforts because of the perception that the EEOC litigation may be deemed frivolous.
Another indicia of the lack of success of the EEOC's litigation program
is the results it achieves. Professor Selmi's detailed study of the EEOC
conducted in the 1990s concluded that while EEOC litigation had a
higher success rate than private litigation, it resulted in smaller awards for
the litigants."1 ' Selmi also assessed the impact of the EEOC's litigation
efforts as measured by the effect of the EEOC litigation on advancing
and developing antidiscrimination laws in the courts and noted that the
EEOC had rarely been a party to the major Supreme Court cases in this
area.112 Selmi concluded that private attorneys could effectively enforce
anti-discrimination laws without the EEOC, with the caveat that some
low-dollar-value cases may not be brought.113
The EEOC's own assessment of the effectiveness of its litigation outcomes does not refute Selmi's findings. Its General Counsel's Office
compared the EEOC's and private attorneys' loss rates when a case was
decided by a court before a trial was conducted.11 4 The EEOC found
that its loss rate was 5.9% as compared to 13.2% for private attorneys.
The win rate for the EEOC at trial was 50.8% as compared to 38.3% for
private attorneys."15 While the review suggests that the EEOC is achieving superior results to private attorneys, it fails to address the issue of the
amount of recovery, which was Selmi's primary focus.11 6 Furthermore,
the better success rate of the EEOC may be explained partially by the
EEOC's ability to select the cases to pursue in litigation after a complete
investigation, including obtaining information obtained directly from the
employer.11 7 Such information obtained directly from the employer is
not likely to be available to private attorneys, which negatively affects
their ability to assess the merits of a claim before filing suit. Thus, it is to
be expected that the EEOC would have a better success rate in litigation
because of its ability to select only the most meritorious cases.
Using another measure, the results of its litigation program as compared to its own alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program, the
110. Id. at *9 & n.4.
111. Selmi, supra note 4, at 23-24 (noting that the dollar recovery for those represented
by private litigants was higher than the EEOC-litigated cases, even when accounting for
the costs of attorneys' fees).
112. See id. at 24.
113. See id. at 39.
114. 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 23-24.
115. Id.
116. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 23-24.
117. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9, the EEOC has the authority to obtain information
from employers using subpoenas. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (West 2010); 29 U.S.C. § 161 (West
2010).
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EEOC's litigation program is also not terribly effective. As compared to
its mediation program, in terms of the dollar compensation obtained relative to cost, the EEOC's litigation program's value is far less. In FY 2007,
the EEOC obtained over $124 million for victims of discrimination
through its mediation program,11 8 which cost approximately $22 million
to operate.119 Thus, for every dollar spent on mediation, the EEOC secured over five dollars for employees, for a recovery ratio of 1:5. By contrast, in FY 2007, the EEOC secured approximately $55 million for
victims of discrimination through claims resolved by the litigation program. 120 The litigation program cost $56 million to operate, giving a return of less than one dollar to employees for every dollar spent, or a
recovery ratio of 1:1.121
While these ratios have varied somewhat from year to year, mediation
has been remarkably more successful in dollars spent to dollars recovered
than litigation.122 In FY 2006, the ratio for the litigation department was
its worst in recent years, with just under $56 million in costs1 2 3 and only
$44 million recovered-a recovery ratio of less than 1:1.124 The mediation budget for that year was only $22 million,125 yet the program recovered $109 million for victims of discrimination,126 for a recovery ratio of
1:4.
The litigation program did better in FYs 2003-2005. For FY 2005, it
recovered $106 million' 27 with a budget of only $39 million,128 improving
its recovery ratio to 1:3. In FY 2004, the budget for litigation was nearly
$49 million' 2 9 and recovered dollars amounted to $160 million,13 0 also
within this recovery ratio of 1:3. For FY 2003, the EEOC remained in
118. EEOC,

2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: STRA(2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/

FISCAL YEAR

TEGIC PLAN OVERVIEW

2007/strategicplan.html [hereinafter 2007 REPORT].
119. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.2.
120. 2007 REPORT, supra note 118.
121. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.2.

122. The numbers for FY 2006: $44 million recovered by litigation, $109 million by
mediation. Costs for FY 2006, $21,975,000 for the mediation program, and $55,854,000 for
litigation. See EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2006: STRATE2

GIC OBJEcrIvE 1 (2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/

006/

objectivel.html [hereinafter 2006 REPORT] (amounts recovered); 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66, tbl.2 (cost).
123.

2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66.

124. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 122; 2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66,

tbl.2.
125.

2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 66.

126. 2006 REPORT, supra note 122.
127. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2005: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2005/mda-objectivel.

html [hereinafter 2005 REPORT3.
128. 2007 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 66, tbl.2.
129. EEOC, FY 2006 PERFORMANCE BUDGET tbl.2 (2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
plan/archives/budgets/2006budget/index.html [hereinafter 2006 PERFORMANCE BUDGET].

On130. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2004: STRATEGIC
4
JECTIVE 1 (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/200 /mda-objectivel.html [hereinafter 2004 REPORT].
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this range, with a recovery of $149 million'l3 and a budget of just over
$55 million. 132 During this same time frame, FYs 2003-2005, the mediation program always exceeded the recovery ratio of the litigation program, with ratios ranging from a high of 1:7 in FY 2005133 to a low of 1:5
in FY 2003.134
This is not to say that the EEOC's litigation program has been a complete failure. Indeed, it has enjoyed some notable successes, even amidst
some of the more embarrassing failures of the early years. For instance,
EEOC litigation resulted in bringing the entire steel industry under a
consent decree to achieve racial desegregation.13 5 Much more recently,
the EEOC obtained a consent decree with Walgreens to eliminate racial
discrimination in its retail management and pharmacy jobs. 136 And in
2008, the EEOC announced a $27 million consent decree entered into
with Sidley Austin, a large law firm, to resolve systemic age discrimination against partners in the firm.137 However, the EEOC has not had any
industry-wide successes in recent years.138
D.

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

Undoubtedly, there have been times when the EEOC has not suffered
from poor management. However, it is clear that throughout its existence, the EEOC has been hampered in its effectiveness by management
issues. In the early years of its existence, there was significant turnover at
the highest levels of the EEOC, contributing to a lack of effective management.13 9 In 1998 and in 2010, the EEOC experienced problems with
filling its most senior positions; the EEOC has twice nearly lost its ability
to conduct official business because it lacked sufficient commissioners to
131. EEOC, FY 2003 PERFORMANCE AND AccoUNTABILITy REPORT (2003), http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/archives/annualreports/par/2003/ [hereinafter 2003 REPORT].
132. EEOC, FY 2005 PERFORMANCE BUDGET tbl.2 (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
plan/archives/budgets/2005budget.html [hereinafter 2005 PERFORMANCE BUDGET].
133. For FY 2005, the EEOC mediation program recovered $115 million for victims of
discrimination at a cost of just over $16 million. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 127; 2007
PERFORMANCE BUDGEt, supra note 66, tbl.2 (cost).

134. For FY 2003, the EEOC's mediation program recovered $116 million at a cost of
$22 million. See 2005 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 132, tbl.2 (cost); 2003 REPORT,
supra note 131 (amount recovered). The EEOC's performance in FY 2004 was closer to
FY 2003 than FY 2005, with $112 million recovered at a cost o nearly $20 million. See 2006
PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 129, tbl.2 (cost); 2004 REPORT, supra note 130
(amount recovered).

135. See Casey Ichniowski, Have Angels Done More? The Steel Industry Consent Decree, 36 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 182 (1983) (describing the decree, events leading to it,

and effect of the decree).

136. 2007 REPORT, supra note 118.
137. 2008 REPORT, supra note 58.

138. The EEOC reports annually to Congress on its programmatic successes. In none
of its recent reports has it mentioned any industry-wide efforts. See 2008 REPORT, supra
note 58; 2007 REPORT, supra note 118; 2006 REPORT, supra note 122; 2005 REPORT, supra
note 127, app. B; 2004 REPORT, supra note 130; 2003 REPORT, supra note 131.

139. Hill, supra note 94, at 74-75.
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do so.14 0 Another factor leading to management problems early in the
EEOC's existence was the lack of specific responsibilities for the commissioners themselves and, potentially caused by this, significant personal
fighting among commissioners during meetings.141 High staff turnover
was a problem within the agency.1 42 In addition, during these early years
there were allegations of significant financial mismanagement and improper handling of discrimination charges, including improper closures of
charges, in the EEOC's district offices.143
GAO reports from the 1970s to 2006 articulate significant management
problems. In the late 1970s, financial mismanagement was so atrocious
that Congress called upon the GAO to investigate the EEOC, and the
GAO issued a scathing report noting numerous accounting and possibly
criminal violations."'4 The Acting Chairman of the EEOC acknowledged
the serious financial mismanagement. 1 4 5 In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the GAO noted that there were indications that the EEOC investigators were not actually investigating claims that they should have investigated.146 Instead, they were issuing "no cause" determinations in order
to close more files and improve their performance rating.147 More recently, in a 2005 report, the EEOC itself informed the GAO that it could
not comply with certain mandatory self-assessments in part because of
"management challenges."1 4 8
Focusing on its most resource-intensive role, the intake unit, a 2008
GAO report noted management failures as indicated by certain key data.
Specifically, the EEOC lacked systemic processes to identify effective
management of the workload of investigators, 149 who comprise between
one-fourth and one-third of the EEOC's total workforce.15 0 The GAO
140. See Reginald E. Jones, Are We Witnessing a Kinder, Gentler EEOC? The EEOC's
Task Force Report on Best Private Sector EEO and Diversity Practices and Other Agency
Trends, 14 LAB. LAW. 317, 318-20 (1998) (discussing the lack of sufficient commissioners in
1998); Kevin McGowan, EEOC Seeks to Rebuild Internally While Awaiting New Agency
Leadership, 10 DAILY LAB. REP (BNA) S-33 (Jan. 19, 2010) (describing situation in 2010).
141. See Hill, supra note 94, at 75, 77.
142. Id. at 75.
143. Id. at 79.
144. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-82-72, CONTINUING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AT THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION (1982), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/118663.pdf.

145. Id. app. I.
146. EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 9.
147. See EEOC: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 83, at 12 (referencing the high rate of "no
cause" determinations and noting that a 1988 report concluded that part of the reason for
the high rate was improper closure of files).
148. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-10, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: ACTIONS TAKEN, BUT AGENCY RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS COULD
BENEFIT FROM A MORE SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATION OF ADVISORY PANEL'S RECOMMENDATIONs 3 (2005).
149. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-589, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: SHARING PROMISING PRACTICES AND FULLY IMPLEMENTING
STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING CAN IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF GROWING WORKLOAD 37 (2008).
150. See id. at 27 (noting total number of non-supervisory investigators between

2004-2008); see also id. at 1 (noting the total number of personnel at the EEOC in 2008).
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found that there was no correlation between workload of investigators
and their ability to close charges in a timely manner.15 1 Another management failure was the EEOC's inability to complete a human capital plan
for more than four years after it was initially required.152 A third management problem was at the highest levels. According to senior officials, the
full Commission failed to take action in a timely manner to approve (or
reject) funding for any commitment of funds in excess of $100,000, which,
among other things, delayed efforts on the human capital plan. 5 3 These
management failures have contributed to the EEOC's ineffectiveness.
Furthermore, they are indicative of the need for a complete overhaul of
the agency. Making a few changes will not change the culture of the
agency. A complete restructuring is needed to revitalize management.
E.

LIMITED ROLE IN PROACTIVELY PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION

The primary focus of the EEOC, as discussed above, is on responding
to discrimination in the workplace by administratively processing charges
of discrimination, investigating them, and litigating them. These are reactive programs in the sense that they respond to claims of discrimination
and attempt to remedy those situations. The theory is that this reactive
role deters subsequent discrimination. That is not the complete extent of
the EEOC's work, however. The EEOC also has some programs designed to proactively prevent (and eliminate) discrimination in the workplace. There are two types of these programs: non-fee-based programs
and fee-based programs. Both these programs are quite modest in scale
and, as a result, have little hope of significantly decreasing discrimination
in the workplace.
1. General Outreach Efforts: Non-Fee Programs
The original text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not
focus much attention on outreach and educational assistance by the
EEOC. However, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress attempted to
make this more of a priority for the EEOC.154 As to victims of discrimination, the EEOC was encouraged to engage in outreach, including outreach to non-English speakers.' 55 As to employers, the Act provided the
EEOC with the power "to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter
such technical assistance as they may request to further their compliance
with this subchapter or an order issued thereunder."1 5 6
In keeping with these statutory mandates, the EEOC has undertaken
some outreach and educational efforts 5 7 as well as some initiatives de151. Id. at 34.
152. Id. at 39.
153. Id. at 42.
154. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4(h)(1) (West 2010).
155. See id. § 2000e-4(h)(2).
156. Id. § 2000e-4(g)(3).
157. One recent outreach effort was focused on educating Arabs and Muslims about
employment discrimination after September 11, 2001. See News Release, EEOC, EEOC
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signed to decrease employment discrimination. 158 The primary outreach
and educational efforts appear to be focused on providing information to
employers and employees. As the EEOC's website states: "EEOC's outreach programs provide general information about the EEOC, its mission, the employment discrimination laws enforced by EEOC and the
charge and complaint process." 159 The "general information" referenced
appears to be any information available on the website,160 which includes1 6 1 an overview of the federal anti-discrimination laws,162 an explanation of the types of employer actions that constitute unlawful
discrimination, 163 and an overview of complaint filing and processing
procedures.164
The EEOC also undertakes hands-on outreach. For instance, in Houston, Texas, the EEOC has worked with nongovernmental entities to get
65
information to Hispanic workers about federal antidiscrimination laws.1
There have also been periodic initiatives undertaken by the EEOC directed at raising awareness of some potential victims of discrimination,
such as the EEOC's Youth@Work initiative1 6 6 and its E-Race
initiative.167
In addition to providing information that appears primarily directed to
potential victims of discrimination so that they understand their rights,168
the EEOC also provides assistance to employers to comply with the laws.
to Receive 'Friend in Government' Award from American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, 2004 WL 2212953, at *1-2 (Oct. 1, 2004) (discussing outreach program).
158. An ongoing initiative is the EEOC's E-Race initiative, which is focused on reducing the most common type of discrimination (race-based). See E-RACE Goals and Initiatives, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/goals.cfm (last visited Oct. 25,
2010).
159. See No-Cost Outreach Programs, EEOC, http://archive.eeoc.gov/outreach/
nocost.html (last modified Mar. 4, 2009).
160. The EEOC also conducts in-person outreach, sometimes working with other entities such as nonprofits. See Shannon Gleeson, From Rights to Claims: The Role of Civil
Society in Making Rights Real for Vulnerable Workers, 43 LAW & Soc'y REv. 669, 673-74,
692 (2009) (describing outreach efforts).
161. The website also includes more technical legal information such as the text of federal anti-discrimination laws and regulations, as well as the EEOC's legal guidance and
compliance manual, all of which appear to be directed primarily at lawyers rather than
laypersons. See Laws, Regulations and Policy Guidance, EEOC, http://archive.eeoc.gov/
policy/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
162. See Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Laws, EEOC, http://
archive.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/overviewlaws.html (last modified Apr. 20, 2004).
163. See Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices,EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/practices/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); Discriminationby Type, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/types
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
164. See Filing a Charge, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/facts/howtofil.html (last modified June
10, 1997).
165. See Gleeson, supra note 160, at 692.
166. Naomi C. Earp, Forty-Three and Counting: EEOC's Challenges and Successes and
Emerging Trends in the Employment Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 145-46

(2007) (describing Youth@Work initiative).
167. See E-RACE Goals and Initiatives, supra note 158 (describing outreach efforts to
potential victims of race discrimination).
168. For example, the EEOC initiative undertaken post-9/11 to address discrimination
against Arabs and Muslims appears primarily directed at outreach efforts to potential victims of discrimination. See News Release, EEOC, supra note 157 (identifying numerous
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One of the sections of the EEOC's website focuses solely on employers. 169 It includes information about employer obligations under antidiscrimination laws17 0 and what to expect when a charge of discrimination is
filed. 17 1
The EEOC's website is not the only means by which the EEOC provides information to employers and employees. EEOC personnel also
speak at panel presentations as well as other events and conferences, providing information in those contexts. 172 However, unless it is charging a
fee, the EEOC does little in terms of education and outreach to employers beyond providing information and designating a person in each field
office to be a liaison to small businesses. 73
2. Fee-Based Programs
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the EEOC was also directed to
create a technical assistance and training institute to assist employers in
complying with the federal antidiscrimination laws. 174 In 1992, the institute became fee-based when Congress passed the EEOC Education,
Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund Act.175 This law explicitly required that fees be charged for training, education, and technical assistance provided to employers and that the fees bear a "reasonable
relationship" to the costs of the assistance provided. 176 It funded the institute with $1 million initially, to be placed in a revolving fund that
would be replenished out of the fees charged to users.' 77 Pursuant to this
legislative mandate, the EEOC created its "Training Institute." 7 8 The
Training Institute conducts seminars and conferences and also does inhouse training at an employer's business location.179
The Training Institute has not been without problems, however. A performance audit performed in FY 2007 found numerous deficiencies, including a lack of vision for the future of the program, failure to keep pace
outreach efforts aimed at educating victims of discrimination but only once mentioning
providing assistance to employers in preventing it).
169. See Employers, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/employers/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
170. See 2010 EEO-1 Survey, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeolsurvey/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining the annual filing requirements for large employers and
federal contractors).
171. See EEOC Investigations-What an Employer Should Know, EEOC, http://
archive.eeoc.gov/employers/investigations.html (last modified Mar. 3, 2003).
172. For instance, the EEOC recently held a public hearing in D.C. regarding age discrimination during the current economic downturn. See Steve Vogel, Age Discrimination
Claims Jump, Worrying EEOC, Worker Advocates, WASH. PosT, July 16, 2009, at A21.
173. See Small Business Liaisons, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/employers/contacts.cfm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(j) (West 2010).
175. Pub. L. No. 102-411, 106 Stat. 2102 (1992).
176. Id. § 2(A)(iii).
177. Id. §§ 2(A), 4.
178. The Training Institute has its own website. See EEOC TRAINING INSTITUTE, http://
www.eeotraining.eeoc.gov/viewpage.aspx?ID=030b9cb8-8e56-433c-a410-cc94ccb64b3a
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
179. The current offerings are available at the Training Institute website. See id.

Reinventing the EEOC

2010]

1255

with technological changes, and funding problems. 180 The size of the
Training Institute is also very small; it has only eight full-time staff. 18 1
The EEOC's full-time equivalent (FTE) personnel for FY 2007 were
2,157,182 which indicates the relative lack of importance of this aspect of
the EEOC's operations. The Training Institute's budget is likewise miniscule compared to the EEOC's total budget, with the Training Institute's
total costs for FY 2007 at less than $1 million, 8 3 while the EEOC's total
budget stood at over $328 million.18 4 With a tiny budget, an inadequate
staff, and a lack of vision, the effectiveness of this training and educational program is questionable at best.
F.

PUTrING IT TOGETHER:

A

TIME FOR CHANGES

These numerous failings make the EEOC an agency ripe for reinvention. Making changes in the manner in which the EEOC operates, rather
than significant structural changes, has been tried and has shown little
evidence of success. For instance, in 2001, the agency was required to
submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) its internal
workforce analysis and plans to restructure the agency to make it more
effective and efficient. 85 The EEOC failed to submit its restructuring
plan on time and eventually brought in outside consultants to create
one.' 8 6 Even with this outside assistance, it failed to submit the required
plan.18 7 Ultimately, it decided to streamline some operations by closing
some offices and outsourcing some call center operations.188 However,
the EEOC never created a complete restructuring plan, and, as late as
2005, it failed to submit any plans to reorganize its headquarters.1 8 9 The
GAO report outlining both the situation and the EEOC's numerous failings illustrates the incredible difficulties of changing the EEOC through
incremental means guided by the Agency itself.190
However, the current administration appears to be willing to embrace
new ideas and has appointed those with significant knowledge of the theory of administrative law within the administration.'91 And perhaps most
180. EEOC, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE EOUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S EDUCATION, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REVOLVING
FUND FY 2007, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/oig/audit-revolvefund.cfm
[hereinafter 2007 PERFORMANCE AUDIT] (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).

181. Id.
182. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.1.
183. See 2007 PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 180.
184. 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7, tbl.1.

185. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 148, at 1, 29 (describing the
OMB requirements).

186. See id. at 14.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 17.
189. See id. at 18, 27.
190. See generally id.
191. See Jonathan Weisman & Jess Bravin, Obarna's Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a
New Tone, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12
3138051682263203.html (commenting on the selection of Cass Sunstein to head the White
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
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importantly, the EEOC is in the midst of experiencing epic turnover. A
2008 GAO report indicates that by 2012, all of the EEOC's senior executives and managers "will be retirement eligible," if not having already
retired. 192 The EEOC is currently in the process of hiring a significant
number of new employees as the current administration has increased its
budget significantly. 19 3 And the EEOC has had two new Commission
positions filled in 2010.194 This provides an opportunity to use the wholesale replacement of employees and managers as a means of changing the
management culture and bringing in managers who embrace a new,
reinvented EEOC.
II. REINVENTING THE EEOC: LEARNING FROM THE PAST
AND USING MODERN GOVERNANCE THEORIES TO
GUIDE THE RESTRUCTURING
There are five specific ways in which the EEOC should be restructured:
(1) the EEOC should no longer be statutorily required to accept, investigate, and conciliate all charges of discrimination and should instead
devote resources only to significant claims; (2) the EEOC should be authorized through Title VII amendment to conduct investigations of employer practices, to allow the EEOC to recover attorneys' fees when it
prevails in litigation, and to impose fines on employers in cases where the
EEOC prevails in litigation; (3) the EEOC should be statutorily authorized to develop a partnership with the federal courts under which the
EEOC would provide mediation services to litigants in employment discrimination claims; (4) the EEOC should increase its information-gathering and analysis activities to better identify trends in employment
discrimination and address those trends; and (5) the EEOC should
devote significantly greater resources to assisting employers with compliance by providing information and conducting training.
These proposals were developed with the goal of creating an optimal
federal antidiscrimination agency. For each proposal, I analyze where the
EEOC has failed and explain how the proposal avoids these pitfalls. The
proposals were also developed in consideration of modern regulatory theories; for each proposal, relevant theoretical justifications are also assessed. In order to understand the regulatory theory involved, a brief
overview is necessary.

192. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 149, at 1.
193. McGowan, supra note 140, at 1 (noting the need to hire more than 100 new employees in 2010).
194. Press Release, U.S. EEOC, Chai Feldblum Sworn in as a Commissioner of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/4-7-10a.cfm (noting that Jacqueline Berrien was sworn in as Chair of the
Commission, and Chai Feldblum as a commissioner, on April 7, 2010).

2010]

A.

Reinventing the EEOC

1257

MODERN THEORIES OF EFFECTIVE AGENCIES: GOVERNANCE, NOT
TRADITIONAL REGULATION

There are a number of scholars who have critiqued the traditional regulatory model for having structural failures1 95 that have contributed to the
failure to achieve agency goals. 196 These structural failings include excessive centralization, which creates a one-size-fits-all approach that may not
be effective in all situations and locations.197 Another structural flaw is
the difficulty of cross-agency cooperation in an era of multiple potential
regulators. 198 A third is the failure of agencies to consider the economic
impact of their oversight on those affected.19 9 Areas where failure has
been identified most commonly include the environmental regulatory
area. 200 Failure of the regulatory process in the workplace has also been
addressed by scholars; however, they primarily focus on safety and health
issues rather than antidiscrimination laws. 201
The flaws with the traditional regulatory model have led to a variety of
suggested changes. While critiques of the traditional regulatory model
are widespread and have been present for decades, suggested improvements have often merely tinkered with the system, adding features such
as consideration of costs and benefits of regulation 202 or the interests of
all parties directly regulated by the agency. 203 At times, critique has led
195. This is to be distinguished from situational failures of the regulatory process such
as a flawed decision by a particular agency not to impose sanctions on a particular entity
that is violating the law, or a decision by the legislature not to regulate in a particular area
of law at all.
196. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 344 (2004);
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1805 (1975).
197. See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 99-100 (1986).
198. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A PoisonedField: Farmworkers,Pesticide Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 431, 451-53 (2004) (discussing the failure of effective regulation of pesticide exposure for farm workers).
199. See Robert W. Hahn et al., EmpiricalAnalysis: Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failureof Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 859, 860-61, 863 (2000) (noting the failure of agencies to conduct effective costbenefit analyses even when they have annual costs of more than $100,000,000).
200. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing
Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 L. & POL'Y 49, 50 (1999) (discussing the
failures of regulation of environmental protection on a national and international level);
Richard B. Stewart, The Future of Environmental Regulation: United States Environmental
Regulation: A Failing Paradigm,15 J.L. & COM. 585, 585, 587 (1996).
201. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, The Failed Promise of Workplace Health Regulation,
111 W. VA. L. REV. 15, 18 (2008). But see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 329-30, 335-36 (2005)
(discussing the failures of regulation as to a variety of aspects of the workplace, including
preventing discrimination, promoting a safe workplace, and ensuring compliance with
wage-hour laws).
202. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE COsT-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 3-5, 8 (2002); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Econom-

ics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 341-42 (1988).
203. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 197, at 102.
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to deregulation in a particular area, such as with airline deregulation. 204
However, a wholesale reconsideration of the administrative system has
also been suggested, with many scholars concluding that the administrative branch of government should be moving toward a governance model
and away from a traditional regulatory model. 205 While it is impossible to
effectively explain governance theories in only a few pages, an overview
of some of the ideas generated by these theorists will provide a foundation for the application of governance theories that underlie the proposed
changes to the EEOC.
In one of the early explorations of a wholesale change of the regulatory
system, Ian Ayres and Jon Braithwaite advocated moving from traditional
regulation to what they termed "responsive regulation." 20 6 Responsive
regulation contains several key features. 207 First, Ayres and Braithwaite
argue that agencies need "big sticks"; that is, significant power to punish
bad behavior. 208 This power to reactively punish should not be the primary focus of an agency; instead, the focus should be on preventing unwanted behavior and persuading corporate actors to engage in desirable
behavior. 20 9 As the authors state: "[tihe trick of successful regulation is
to establish a synergy between punishment and persuasion," neither approach being fully successful on its own. 210 Using a punishment approach
will undermine voluntary self-compliance in some circumstances, while
some entities will not comply unless the costs of noncompliance are sufficient. 211 Thus, they articulate what is termed "TFT," short for "tit-fortat," under which regulators assume voluntary compliance until faced
with violations. 212 A second component to their concept of responsive
regulation is the enforcement pyramid. 2 13 Regulators start with the leastpunitive approach, that is, persuasion, and then escalate the response to
violations bit-by-bit until the regulated entity complies. 214 Drawing heavily on economic and game theory as well as sociological research, their
vision is of a regulator who begins with a presumption of trust and uses
204. See Michael E. Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public
Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179-80 (1981). Some of the suggested changes
to the traditional model devolve from purely political positions, as with the generalized
Republican push for deregulation. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 354. This is not what I
mean by a more modern approach to regulation.
205. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 196, at 4; Lobel, supra note 196, at 344.
206. IAN AYRES & JON BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-4 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992).
207. See id. at 5-6.
208. See id. at 19.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 25. Ayres & Braithwaite use game theory and sociological research to support this approach. Id. The fundamental idea is that at times, individuals are motivated by
rational self-interest, by which legal compliance is secured best by deterring bad behavior
(punishment model), while at other times, individuals are motivated by other factors such
as a desire to do the "right thing," by which legal compliance is best secured using voluntary approaches. See id. at 20, 22, 24-25.
211. See generally id. at 19-53.
212. Id. at 19, 21-22.
213. Id. at 20.
214. Id. at 35.
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the fear of substantial punishments, not minor fines, to cajole compliance
on an individual level and to create a culture of compliance on an industry level. 215
Furthermore, Ayres and Braithwaite advocate for a tripartite structure
of regulation, giving private interest groups an active role in regulation to
act as guardians against agency capture and to assist in ensuring that the
interests of the public are not lost. 2 1 6 Another key aspect to their model
involves enforced self-regulation by companies, where companies create
the applicable rules, the agency approves the rules, and then the agency
has oversight authority focusing on ensuring that the compliance group
within the company is functioning effectively and, if not, the agency sanctions the company. 217
Jody Freeman subsequently articulated a somewhat similar model of
administration, calling it collaborative governance. 2 18 Freeman's model
"views the administrative process as a problem-solving exercise in which
parties share responsibility for all stages of the rule-making process, in
which solutions are provisional, and in which the state plays an active, if
varied, role." 219 There are five key features of Freeman's model:220 (1) a
"problem-solving orientation" of the agency, using collaboration and
face-to-face discussions to achieve quality solutions;22 1 (2) broad participation in the administrative process, both in formulating questions and
identifying problems as well as in suggesting appropriate action and resolutions; 222 (3) provisional solutions and a commitment to revisiting issues
in light of the changing societal context and scientific developments; 223
(4) oversight functions located in entities other than the agency itself, including non-traditional arrangements such as self- and third-party monitoring;224 and (5) flexible agency roles such as facilitator of multi-party
negotiations to resolve problems, information provider, and consensus
builder, in addition to the traditional role of enforcer. 2 25
As is evident from quick comparison of the features of responsive regulation and collaborative governance, they share certain core ideas. Recognizing these similarities, as well as drawing on the works of other
scholars in this field, Orly Lobel recently synthesized the works of these
scholars into .a new governance model that shifts the core concepts of
regulation in the following ways. 2 2 6 First, rather than relying on experts
to make top-down decisions, the governance model is participatory and
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See generally id. at 50-53.
See id. at 54-60.
Id. at 106-07.
Freeman, supra note 196, at 4-6.
Id. at 6.
See id. at 22.
Id. at 22-27.
Id. at 22, 27-28.
Id. at 22, 28-29.
Id. at 22, 30-31.
Id. at 22, 31-33.
See Lobel, supra note 196, at 344.
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collaborative in nature. 227 For example, instead of experts deciding on the
substantive law and then delivering services, affected parties have a significant voice in determining substance as part of an ongoing dialogue
with the agency. 2 2 8 Third-party agents, including private sector and nonprofit entities, can be involved in the delivery of governmental services. 229 Second, in lieu of a uniform approach, the governance model
embraces a multiplicity of approaches; it recognizes that not all situations
are alike and that diversity is helpful in achieving the administrative
agency's goals. 230 Third, governance promotes decentralization of decision-making and provision of services at the locality level rather than by a
centralized authority. 23 1 Fourth, the regulatory view of separate domains
involving discrete areas of law is replaced by a holistic, broader perspective, encouraging consideration of related fields of authority and law to
better determine appropriate action. 232 Fifth, governance models stress
flexibility of approach and the use of noncoercive tactics (so-called "soft
law") rather than relying solely on government enforcement standards or
rules. 2 3 3 Sixth, the governance model replaces ideas of infallibility and
inflexibility of regulatory regimes with their opposites, celebrating
change, responsiveness to change, and a recognition that trial and error is
inevitable, especially given constant social change. 234 Seventh, in order
to prevent problems potentially caused by deregulation and decentralization, the governance model adds the concept of orchestration; that is, one
of the roles of an administrative agency is to coordinate efforts at the
local, state, and national levels to ensure coherence and find the appropriate level (local, state, or national) at which decisions should be
made. 2 3 5 Not all these ideas are relevant to the EEOC. However, at
least one governance concept supports each of the following proposals.
B.

EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO
THE EEOC

1. Proposal One: Eliminating Charge Investigation and Focusing on
Significant Litigation
First, as others have articulated before me, the EEOC's charge236 This will allow the
processing obligations need to be eliminated.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 378.
229. Id. at 374-75. Lobel discusses participatory and collaborative features separately.
See id. at 348. I find them so intertwined that they are more readily understood together.
230. Id. at 379-81.
231. Id. at 381.
232. Id. at 385-86.
233. Id. at 388-89.
234. Id. at 395-96.
235. Id. at 400.
236. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that the EEOC's charge-processing functions are an expensive way of screening out non-viable claims and that they should be
eliminated); Green, supra note 23, at 311-14 (advocating the use of mandatory mediation
as a potential solution to the problem of insufficient resources to investigate and resolve
charges effectively).
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agency to focus its limited resources 237 on more effective techniques of
combating and eliminating discrimination. Claims by employees of discrimination should be treated as other federal civil rights claims are and
should be brought in federal courts without first mandating the EEOC
administrative process.
This elimination of an incredibly expensive function is the foundation
of all that follows. The elimination of the administrative charge-processing role is justified because of all the problems with it identified in Section L.A above: it is costly and has never been and cannot be done
effectively. From a pragmatic perspective, the EEOC does not need to
investigate all claims of discrimination any longer. In the wake of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, with the allowance of compensatory damages
and jury trials,238 the increased incentives for private attorneys to undertake the cause of investigating and representing victims of discrimination
suggest that the EEOC's efforts are not needed in many cases. 239 As
Professor Selmi found in his research, private attorneys appear to do a
better job recovering damages for their clients than do EEOC attorneys. 240 In addition, there are non-profit entities that also represent victims who may not have access to an attorney. 24 1 In short, there is no real
need for the EEOC to attempt to investigate all the individual claims that
involve settled issues of law-these can be handled by other groups in
society. Furthermore, the ability and need for the EEOC to act as an
investigator in all cases is questionable at best. The agency itself recognizes this in its systemic tracking system under which some charges filed
with it will not be investigated at all.2 4 2
Modern governance models support the goal of investigating and litigating only significant claims. Specifically, leaving enforcement in the
237. The EEOC has never been funded at a level that would allow full investigation of
all charges filed with it. See Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An EmpiricalStudy
of the Implementation of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 104 (2001) (noting that "[the history of
the EEOC ... can be seen as a series of attempts to deal with the inescapable fact that the
Agency lacked the resources to do the job it had been assigned to do").
238. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2006).
239. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 3-4.
240. See id. at 23.
241. There are numerous legal aid organizations that provide assistance with claims of
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Employment Law Project, THE LEGAL AID SociETY, http://www.legal-aid.org/en/civil/civilpractice/employmentlawproject.aspx (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the New York Legal Aid Society's Employment Law Project,
which provides assistance on employment issues including discrimination claims); About,
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY-EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER, http://www.las-elc.orglabout.html

(last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the San Francisco area Legal Aid Society's Employment Law Center, which provides counseling on employment discrimination as well as
conducting employment discrimination litigation); Free & Low Cost Legal Services in Utah,
"AND

JUSTICE FOR ALL" (2008), http://andjusticeforall.org[Lgal%2OAid%20Resource

%20Guide.pdf (describing available legal aid in Utah, including the Utah Legal Services,
which provides representation and counseling in the area of employment discrimination);
About Us, LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ROANOKE VALLEY, http://lasrv.org/AboutUs.cfm?page

name=AboutUs (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the Roanoke Legal Aid Society's
mission, which includes representing individuals in employment discrimination cases).
242. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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hands of private parties is consistent with the governance concept of devolving government involvement to the entities best equipped to handle
it and, where enforcement is effective in private hands, leaving it there. 243
In this situation, much of Title VII enforcement is at least as effective in
the hands of private attorneys as it is with the EEOC.
In addition to the practical impossibility of investigating all charges and
the growth of private attorney representation, which indicates a decreased need for EEOC investigation, governance theory suggests that by
focusing attention, even if limited, on all claims, the EEOC hampers its
mission. This occurs because those who are regulated, employers, perceive the agency as nit-picking when it uses resources to address all complaints of discrimination. 244 As a result, employers lose respect for the
agency and are less inclined to comply with the agency.
An example of a situation that would lead to employer disgruntlement
with the EEOC may help illustrate the problem. Assume an employee
claims a co-worker does not like him because of his religion. The coworker has never expressed by words or actions anything about the employee's religion, but the employee is convinced that the co-worker is
harboring ill will. The co-worker has no authority over the employee and
has no say in the employee's job responsibilities. The co-worker is admittedly antisocial. He does not talk to people at work other than to respond to work-related questions. The employee is convinced that this
unwillingness to socialize with co-workers is, when directed at him, because of religion, even though the co-worker is universally antisocial. The
employee files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC
must accept the charge. Even if the EEOC ultimately decides that there
is no basis for the charge, it must devote sufficient attention to it to make
this determination. The employer is aware of the charge and that it is
pending with the EEOC. In the eyes of the employer, any attention by
the EEOC to this charge is too much attention-why is it, thinks the employer, that the EEOC is not focusing on meritorious claims?
The EEOC needs the authority to decide which claims to accept and
which ones to allow private attorneys to handle. At present, it has to
accept them all, contributing to the employer perception that the EEOC
wastes employers' time and that it is insignificant to have an EEOC
charge pending. This perception detracts from the EEOC's ability to create a meaningful system of preventing or remediating discrimination. 245
From the employee's perspective, the EEOC's current structure and
practice may mislead the employee by appearing to promise an investiga243. See Freeman, supra note 196, at 30-31.
244. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, at 50-53.
245. The EEOC itself has recognized the need to focus greater resources outside of its
intake role. When it adopted its National Enforcement Plan, it identified a three-pronged
approach to eliminating discrimination. The first prong identified was engaging in education and outreach. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT PLAN, supra note 46.
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tion of every charge. 2 4 6
I propose to redefine the EEOC's charge processing role to become an
investigator and litigator of only significant claims. The EEOC would no
longer intake all complaints of discrimination. Title VII would need to be
amended to make this change. 247 Shedding the charge-processing role
will eliminate a significant set of responsibilities for the agency. It will
not have to provide personnel to assist in filing complaints. 248 It will not
have to manage a huge volume of complaints. 249 It will not have to produce and mail thousands of right-to-sue letters that currently are required
to trigger an employee's right to bring suit in court. 250
The EEOC should focus on investigating and litigating significant
claims. Significant claims are those claims involving novel and important
legal issues, such as claims that have potential to develop the law. Significant claims also include those of systemic discrimination as well as discrimination that is endemic in a particular industry or field, even if only a
single person is affected in any given workplace. This is consistent with
the EEOC's own articulation of appropriate use of its resources.2 51 Furthermore, the EEOC should not focus on claims where it lacks the capacity to effectively investigate. Instead, the EEOC should limit the number
of its cases so that it can provide sufficient resources to do the job properly when it elects to do so. 2 5 2
Limiting the EEOC's litigation to significant claims is necessary for
many of the reasons described above. In addition to these rationales, the
reality is that the EEOC has already tried other systems, and they have
failed. The EEOC has tried twice to investigate and litigate all meritorious claims, with the result that it has become completely overwhelmed by
the sheer numbers involved. 25 3 Recognizing this, the EEOC has been
moving in the direction I advocate. This process began in the mid-1990s,
when the EEOC created a National Enforcement Plan (NEP) as well as
246. See Moss et al., supra note 237, at 3-4 (suggesting that employees are misled because while only a small number of charges actually receive an investigation, the administrative system suggests that all individual claims will receive one).
247. Title VII currently establishes basic requirements to file a charge of discrimination
and requires the EEOC to investigate all charges filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
248. While this may seem to be a simple task because the charge filed with the EEOC is
a prerequisite to sue in court, filing a charge properly is complex enough to fill 29 C.F.R
§ 1601.6 through § 1601.14. U.S. EEOC Procedure for the Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6-.14 (2008).
249. In FY 2009, there were over 93,000 charges filed with the EEOC. See Charge
Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2009, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
250. See U.S. EEOC Notice of Right to Sue: Procedure and Authority, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28 (2008).

251. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN, supra note 46.
252. The EEOC was recently hit with a $4.5 million attorneys' fees award in a case
where the court repeatedly denounced the agency for its failure to investigate the allegations before filing suit. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2010
WL 520564, *7-8, *20 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2010). Perhaps if the agency were not overwhelmed with the number of claims it must handle, it could have avoided this costly error.
253. See supra Part I.B.
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Local Enforcement Plans (LEPs) for each field office. 25 4 The NEP articulated a litigation strategy focused on three categories of cases: (1)
cases involving legal violations that have a potential impact beyond the
immediate parties (but not limited to systemic discrimination); (2) cases
with the potential to develop the law in the direction consistent with eliminating discrimination; and (3) cases involving the EEOC policies or practices, such as cases testing EEOC regulations or guidance. 255 As is
evident, the NEP has significant overlap with my proposal to limit EEOC
litigation to significant claims. The goal of the LEPs was to develop a
"strategic, focused enforcement plan." 256 This effort was hampered by
lack of coordination on both a national and local level. 2 5 7 The EEOC's
field offices appeared to differ with respect to what the focus of enforcement should be.2 5 8 In addition, the LEPs were overly focused on how
each office would manage its inventory of charges. 2 59
While the NEP and LEPs have moved the EEOC in the direction I
advocate, they have not solved the EEOC's problems, and more permanent structural changes are needed to effectuate long-term change. The
current triage process for handling charges could be changed by EEOC
management at any time. In fact, it has been changed several times over
the course of the EEOC's existence. 2 6 0 As discussed in Part I, the EEOC
has gone back and forth over time as to how to manage its intake role,
without success. 261 It is time to change the EEOC's role permanently to
eliminate this function.
As to the downsides of removing the current statutory mandate that
the EEOC accept, investigate, and conciliate all charges filed with it, the
benefits of the charge processing system in its current state appear to be
threefold: (1) it provides information about systemic discrimination to the
EEOC to investigate and potentially litigate; (2) it may screen out some
non-meritorious claims; and (3) as to charges where the parties agree to
mediate, the EEOC has been quite successful in resolving charges. All
these benefits can be captured without the cost of the cumbersome, complex, and expensive charge management system.
First, as discussed in Part II.B.4, modern governance theory suggests
that the EEOC should update and expand its information-gathering function.2 6 2 The data gathered can be used to determine what companies are
254. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PLAN, supra note 46.
255. Id.
256. See EEOC, PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE LITIGATION TASK FORCE
REPORT (Mar. 1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task-reports/charge-handling.cfm (Section
IV).
257. Id. (Section III).
258. Id. (noting the need for change so that "LEPs of all field offices, when taken as a
whole . . . set forth a comprehensive national law enforcement program").
259. Id. (Section V).

260. See supra Part I.B.
261. See supra Part I.
262. See supra Part II.B.4.
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investigated for potential systemic discrimination. In addition to this
source of information, the EEOC could also establish an online and/or
phone-operated system to allow those with information about systemic
discrimination to report it. Rather than being legally obligated to sift
through tens of thousands of charges and categorize each one, the EEOC
would be able to self-select the complaints it investigates and direct its
attention to areas that are most important.
Second, the benefit of screening out nonmeritorious cases is questionable at best. This is because the EEOC cannot bar a plaintiff from seeking
redress through the courts; all it can do is issue a right-to-sue letter and
inform the plaintiff that the EEOC does not believe that there is a
claim. 2 6 3 Employees are still free to sue in federal court if they wish. 2 6 4
Furthermore, this role of telling employees that they lack a viable claim
will end up being filled by private attorneys in the absence of the EEOC.
Because these claims are taken on a contingency basis, plaintiffs' lawyers
are incentivized to screen out nonmeritorious claims and refuse to take
them. Employees will still be able to bring suit in federal court, but the
number of those who will seems unlikely to be much different whether a
plaintiff's lawyer, an EEOC employee, or no one (as is frequently the
case now for claims that do not get investigated) tells them that they do
not have a viable claim.
Third, the EEOC's mediation role will be preserved in a slightly different form, as discussed in Part II.B.3, maintaining this effective program.
2. Proposal Two: Promote Effective Self-Regulation by Developing
Model Policies and Conducting Training and Outreach
With significant resources made available by eliminating charge
processing, the question inevitably becomes how those resources should
be allocated. The EEOC should use these resources to assist employers
in creating effective self-regulatory regimes. Thus, the second component
to the restructured EEOC is the development of a large section of the
agency devoted to (1) providing information and (2) conducting outreach
and training for employers.
The rise of self-regulation as an integral part of the administrative enforcement of employee rights is evident.265 It is one of the hallmark features of modern governance theories. 266 But a crucial concern that arises
in self-regulatory systems is the need to ensure that the self-regulation is
effective. 267 There are two components to this. First, the employer has to
adopt appropriate policies and practices. 268 Second, there needs to be
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
264. Id.
265. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 77-78 (2010).
266. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, at 131-32.
267. See ESTLUND, supra note 265, at 99 (noting that Wal-Mart had adopted policies
and practices that indicated compliance with legal standards but failed to enforce them).
268. See id. at 75-104 (providing examples of employer-created policies and practices to
comply with workplace laws).
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some mechanism to provide oversight. 269
In the area of employment discrimination, Professor Estlund has posited that a system of enforced self-regulation, which she refers to as coregulation, currently exists. 270 Employers are encouraged to self-regulate
and to create antidiscrimination policies and practices because of Supreme Court cases that have created defenses to discrimination claims for
employers who have such policies and practices. 271 Employers' self-regulation is overseen by the courts, as the employers' policies and procedures
must be effective in order for the defense to be applicable. 2 72
The EEOC should become an active participant in the enforced selfregulation of employers. The EEOC can become an effective participant
by assisting employers in developing policies and procedures that are the
heart of employer self-regulation. In addition, where self-regulation fails,
the EEOC must be enabled to become a more powerful force in
enforcement.
The EEOC already provides some assistance to employers in the development and implementation of effective antidiscrimination policies and
procedures, but this is insufficient. At present, the EEOC does not offer
to employers examples of good personnel policies and practices that are
consistent with federal antidiscrimination laws and promote the EEOC's
goal of eradicating employment discrimination. 2 73 The EEOC should
provide examples of sound employer policies and practices. 274 I envision
the EEOC providing several types of information in this category. First,
and most basic, the EEOC should develop a sample equal employment
opportunity policy. While the EEOC has posters covering the basics of
federal antidiscrimination laws, 2 7 5 this effort should be expanded. Most
mid-sized and large employers have employee handbooks. Employees
are encouraged or, in some instances, required to read these handbooks.
Employers do not require or encourage employees to read the posters
269. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 206, at 104-06 (advocating having a corporate compliance officer who would be responsible for reporting violations to the government); ESTLUND, supra note 265, at 75-130 (identifying different manners of enforcing the
self-regulation).
270. See EsTLuND, supra note 265, at 83-88.
271. See id. at 86-87 (discussing the effects of Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998), Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Kolstad v. Am. Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)).
272. See id. at 88. Professor Estlund acknowledges that it is not yet clear whether this
oversight is effective, as courts could cursorily assess the employer's policies and practices.
273. The EEOC website offers limited guidance to employers on what constitutes prohibited discrimination: that is, what cannot be done. It does not, however, provide specific
positive guidance on what employers should be doing. See, e.g., Policy Guidance Documents Related to Age Discrimination,EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/types/age-guidance.cfm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (providing general policy guidance on age discrimination in
employment but failing to provide model policies or practices for employers).
274. I am not the only former employer representative to note that the EEOC needs to
provide greater assistance to employers in order to assist them in complying with the law.
Former Commissioner Reginald Jones has also noted this need. See Jones, supra note 140,
at 320.
275. See Publications Request Form, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
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that line the walls of break rooms. It would be fairly easy for the EEOC
to develop sample equal employment opportunity policies. This type of
policy was one of the very first policies that I, as an attorney in private
practice, advised clients to include in their handbook. Not all employers
have attorneys to advise them to do so, and even if there is a human
resources officer, it is not certain that person will have the expertise to
draft such a policy. It was my experience that many policies seemed to be
e-mailed from company to company. Some were good; others were not.
The EEOC could make immediate change by providing a sample policy
on its website that employers could at least use as a good basis for their
own policy. Other federal agencies provide this type of assistance: for
instance, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
provides many sample policies to employers. 276
Second, the EEOC should develop frequently asked questions (FAQs)
for employers to address common scenarios employers face 277 and provide guidance on how employers should handle such scenarios. 278 For
instance, there is a body of research indicating that applicants with nonwhite-sounding names are less likely to receive an interview than applicants with white-sounding names. 279 The EEOC could explain different
ways that employers could avoid this type of bias in a FAQ section devoted to hiring. Other common hiring issues include such problems as
employers not knowing what questions to ask and what questions they
should not ask of applicants.
While the EEOC has provided guidance on this topic, the guidance is
not in a location or format helpful to employers. For instance, the EEOC
website provides an overview of what is illegal for employers to do. 2 8 0
The page is overwhelming and poorly organized. It starts with an explanation of what is illegal in the hiring process, moves into unlawful behav276. See, e.g., Hazard Communication HAZCOM Programs,OSHA, http://www.osha.
gov/dsg/hazcom/solutions.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (providing sample Hazard Communication Plan for bloodborne pathogens).
277. The EEOC has developed some FAQs. However, the FAQs are focused on very
specific types of discrimination and are for the benefit of employees. See, e.g., Youth at
Work Religious Discrimination-FAQs,EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/youth/religion2.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
278. The EEOC did focus on developing an understanding and providing examples of
employer "best practices" in the 1990s. However, the results of the EEOC's work, including examples of employers' practices that promote diversity in the workplace and prevent
discrimination, are not included directly on its website. Instead, they are located in a task
force report (which can be obtained on the website, but is difficult to locate, and the material is not presented in a readily-usable format). See Best Practices of Private Sector Employers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task-reports/best-practices.cfm (last visited Oct.
21, 2010). The results are also available in a law review article written by a Commissioner.
See generally Jones, supra note 140 (describing the EEOC's work and providing concrete
examples of best practices). In addition, the EEOC decided to use the results in its
presentations. See id. at 337.
279. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
94 AM. ECON. REv. 991, 1011 (2004).
280. See Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices,EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/laws/practices/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).

1268

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

ior in the terms and conditions of employment, and then discusses
discharge and discipline. After that, it goes back to terms and conditions
with a focus on harassment and then moves to pre-employment questioning. There appears to be no rational organizational effort. Furthermore,
the content is extremely limited, with much of the substance stating repetitively that it is illegal to discriminate. There appears to have been no
attempt to provide specific examples of lawful versus unlawful conduct.28 Employers are forced to resort to paying attorneys for answers
to basic questions because the EEOC has failed to provide this information to the public in a useful manner. 2 82
Beyond such basic information, the EEOC can also promote diversity
in employment by providing accessible, useful guidance on employer best
practices. Identifying these best practices is something the EEOC has
done in the past and could replicate at present. For instance, in 1997, the
EEOC created a task force devoted to defining and identifying such best
practices in employment. 283 The task force released a report on these
best practices. 284 The failure on the part of the EEOC was not the work
it did 2 8 5 but instead what it did with that work-it failed to proactively
disseminate the information in the report to employers to enable them to
change workplace policies and procedures. 286 The next step, taking the
information obtained and converting it into useful material for employers, is essential to the success of any EEOC program to decrease employment discrimination in the workplace. More recently, the EEOC did
create a "Best Practices" webpage focusing on preventing discrimination
against those persons who have caregiving (family) responsibilities. 2 87
The information on the page is helpful and understandable. However,
the page is buried in the EEOC website and is extremely difficult to locate. 2 8 8 The lack of readily-available positive examples of best practices
281. See id.
282. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form From Substance: Understanding Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTs. & EMP'T POL'Y J. 1, 14-34 (1999) (discussing the extent to which employers rely upon lawyers to advise them on complying with
antidiscrimination laws).
283. See Press Release, U.S. EEOC, Commission Releases Task Force Report on
"Best" Private Sector EEO Efforts (Dec. 22, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/12-22-97.cfm.
284. See id.
285. The report is quite detailed and contains useful information about the concept of
best practices, as well as specific examples of what employers have been doing that have
proven to be effective. See Best Practices of Private Sector Employees, supra note 278.
286. It is not clear what the EEOC did with the report, other than posting it on its
website, and issuing a press release, but it could not have done very much to publicize it.
In the years immediately following the EEOC's release of the task force report, I assisted
employers in designing, modifying, and conducting litigation involving their employment
policies. Despite being active in the area and attending conferences focusing on employment discrimination laws, I do not recall knowing about it until I began researching this
Article.
287. See Employer Best Practicesfor Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
288. It is not listed among the materials listed to assist employers. It can be found if
one knows it exists by doing a search of the website using "best practices"; however, this is
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may be contributing to the development of a defensive strategy by employers to limit the viability of discrimination claims. Without best practices, employers turn to defensive strategies to deter employment
discrimination claims. 2 89
Providing these types of information to employers would make the
EEOC more of a partner with employers, in preventing discrimination,
rather than only being seen by employers as an employee-advocating
agency. However, merely providing information is only the first step in
expanding its partnership with employers. I also propose that the EEOC
should greatly expand its employer-training program. As discussed in
Part I.E., the EEOC is currently authorized to have a fee-based training
program. 290 This program is tiny. 291 The program should be greatly expanded and fees should be significantly reduced. The program should be
expanded to create a group of full-time attorneys who oversee a staff of
employees that conduct training programs nationwide. The first targeted
audience should be smaller employers covered by the federal antidiscrimination laws. Large employers should be a lesser concern, simply because of the reality that many larger employers do have sufficient
resources to obtain counsel from private attorneys to comply with federal
antidiscrimination laws. 2 92 Smaller employers lack the finances to pay for
private attorneys and also frequently lack a human resources
department. 293
These training programs should have three components: (1) educating
attendees on federal antidiscrimination laws; (2) training attendees to
present information at their own workplaces; and (3) offering open question and answer sessions. Through these training programs, the EEOC
will gain valuable insight into the kinds of problems that employers are
handling on a day-to-day basis, which can be used to shape future training
programs as well as the FAOs that the EEOC puts on its website.
As experience presenting at several such training programs in the private sector (provided by large law firms) makes clear, when the training is
of little use to an employer who is browsing the website looking for guidance on complying
with the antidiscrimination laws.
289. See generally Bisom-Rapp, supra note 282, at 3 (describing the increasing use of
defensive strategies by employers and positing that such strategies may conceal
discrimination).
290. See supra Part I.E.
291. See supra Part I.E.2; 2009 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 7.
292. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 282, at 14-16.
293. The EEOC recognizes this fact. Its website informs small businesses that if they
have questions not answered on the website, they can contact a small business liaison. See
Employers, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/employers/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). However, there are only fifty such liaisons nationwide. See Small Business Liaisons, EEOC,
http://eeoc.gov/employers/contacts.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). Given that, as of 2006,
there were more than five million businesses in the U.S. with fewer than twenty employees,
each liaison would be responsible for approximately 100,000 businesses. See Statistics of
U.S. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2007), http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/ (providing
the most recent data on small businesses in the United States). It is doubtful that these
liaisons can effectively assist a significant number of the businesses for which they are
responsible.

1270

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

free, there is no lack of attendees. At the outset, these training programs
should be conducted free of charge to get the word out that they are
valuable and useful. After the programs become accepted and space becomes limited, the EEOC should impose charges on employers, using a
sliding scale based on an employer's size.
Another possible means for the EEOC to assist employers is to provide
hands-on assistance. Using its data from the EEO-1 surveys, the EEOC
can identify workplaces that do not have a workforce that mirrors the
available labor pool. 294 These employers can be contacted and notified of
the discrepancy. The EEOC can provide its suggested policies and practices for improving workplace diversity to these employers. It can also
offer personalized assistance. This type of assistance, having the potential
to be very labor-intensive, and thus expensive, should be directed toward
specific industries that the EEOC is targeting to improve labor participation rates of underrepresented groups. 295
Combining information-providing and training directed at those with
the ability to prevent discrimination from occurring-employers-will result in increased compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws in a
more effective manner than the current EEOC approach, which is primarily reactive in nature. It will decrease the need for costly litigation to
deter discrimination and help ensure that the EEOC is not operating in
an information vacuum when it comes to employer concerns.
3.

Proposal Three: Increase EEOC Enforcement Powers

Turning to the enforcement and oversight component of self-regulation, as noted in Part I, supra, the EEOC has always had limited enforcement authority. 296 To ensure effective self-regulation, the EEOC needs
to have sufficient clout to be able to spur recalcitrant employers to comply with the law.
In order to obtain employer cooperation and ensure effective self-regulation, the EEOC needs to engender greater fear in employers of EEOC
litigation. The EEOC has no real powers it can use against employers
other than its limited subpoena power 297 and the ability to litigate
cases. 298 Employers already face the threat of document production requests (akin to the subpoena power) and the overall threat of litigation
294. This mirrors what the Occupational Safety and Health Administration recently did
when it notified employers who had high levels of workplace injuries of their high levels,
made suggestions for preventing injuries, and offered assistance to any employer who was
interested. See News Release, OSHA, U.S. Labor Department's OSHA Notifies 15,000
Workplaces Nationwide of High Injury and Illness Rates (Mar. 9, 2010), http://osha.gov/
pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?ptable=NEWS_RELEASES&pid=17238.
295. OSHA maintains a policy of providing compliance assistance to any employer who
requests it, but it gives priority to small employers in industries where workplace hazards
are particularly high. See OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 2-2 (2009), http://
osha.gov/OshDoclDirective-pdflCPL_02-00-148.pdf.
296. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(d) (2006).
297. See id. § 2000e-9; 29 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
298. See § 2000e-5 (establishing enforcement powers of the EEOC).
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from private sector attorneys; 299 EEOC litigation is no worse than litigation from private sector attorneys for reasons discussed below. This
means that the EEOC has no significant leverage against employers to
ensure cooperation.
In addition to its current authority to subpoena records and litigate
cases, the restructured EEOC needs to have the authority (1) to investigate employer policies and practices to determine whether there is unlawful discrimination present and (2) to obtain attorneys' fees and fines
against employers who engage in unlawful discrimination.
As to the first point, the EEOC already has some investigative authority.300 It can issue subpoenas seeking information relevant to a charge
filed with the agency. 30 1 However, this subpoena power is limited to obtaining information regarding existing charges of discrimination; the
EEOC lacks the power to issue subpoenas absent such a charge. 302 Thus,
unlike OSHA, 303 the EEOC is unable to proactively investigate. 304 This
limits the EEOC's ability to control its own enforcement efforts. 305 By
contrast, OSHA has developed its own priority system for enforcing federal workplace safety laws. 30 6 The EEOC can only react and select
among existing charges to investigate. 307 While there may at times be
charges that correspond with the EEOC's desired enforcement efforts,
there is no guarantee that this is reality.
This limited investigative power also means that employers who do not
have charges pending against them are insulated from EEOC investigation.30 8 While some such employers may not need to be investigated, as
the lack of charges indicates a lack of unlawful discrimination, this is not
necessarily true of all employers. 309 Some employers may not have
charges brought against them despite engaging in unlawful discrimination. 310 For instance, an employer with a workforce that contains workers who lack knowledge of their rights (the classic example being
undocumented workers) may have no charges pending due to the lack of
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
300. See § 2000e-5.
301. See § 161; § 2000e-9; EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 65 (1984) (holding that a
charge is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" for an EEOC-issued subpoena).
302. See § 161; § 2000e-9; Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 65.
303. See OSHA Authority for Inspection, 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3(a) (2010) (compliance officer entitled to inspect during reasonable working hours; no requirement of a complaint
being filed).
304. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 64-65.
305. Id.
306. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA INsPECTIONs 3 (2002), http://www.osha.gov/
Publications/osha2098.pdf (describing OSHA's priorities in conducting inspections).
307. See Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 64-65.
308. They are not entirely insulated, as commissioners have the authority to bring a
charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
309. See generally Bisom-Rapp, supra note 282, at 3 (describing the increasing use of
defensive strategies by employers and positing that such strategies may conceal
discrimination).
310. Id.
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knowledge or fear of reporting discrimination. 3 1' Thus, employers may
have facially discriminatory policies that are never revealed and changed.
Perhaps most importantly, however, because I am advocating that the
entire charge processing system be dismantled, the EEOC's investigative
powers need to be decoupled from that charge processing system. In lieu
of investigations that are reactive and limited to existing charges, I propose that Title VII be amended to allow the EEOC to undertake investigations where (1) a complaint has been filed with a court or (2) there is a
reasonable basis to believe that a violation of federal employment discrimination laws has occurred. This expands the EEOC's authority in a
limited way to allow it to focus on situations where a person may not feel
able to file a claim. 312
Where a complaint has been filed with a court, the EEOC still needs to
be able to investigate to determine whether the individual claim might, in
fact, prove to implicate more employees than the individual bringing suit.
A single employee may challenge an employer's practice that can affect
thousands of employees. 313 The EEOC needs to be able to investigate
and, if necessary, bring suit on behalf of affected individuals who have
not yet sued.
In addition to investigation in response to a court-filed complaint, the
EEOC also needs to be able to investigate when it has a reasonable basis
to believe that the federal antidiscrimination laws have been violated in
order to uncover discrimination where employees are unwilling or unable
to file a claim in federal court. The EEOC may obtain information from
the EEO-1 forms 3 14 that may indicate unlawful discrimination is occurring.3 15 It may also receive information from employees, via the online or
phone complaint line, who have not filed suit, as discussed above, that
indicates unlawful discrimination. The EEOC should be empowered to
investigate these situations to determine whether it should bring suit on
its own. This type of investigative authority is similar to the investigative
authority of OSHA. OSHA conducts programmed (planned) inspections
of workplaces based on OSHA's determination of the degree of hazards
311. For a discussion of some of the impediments to these workers filing charges of

discrimination, see Gleeson, supra note 160, at 669-75.
312. At present, the EEOC has a limited ability to investigate without an individual
filing a charge of discrimination. Commissioners may file charges, and then the EEOC is
able to investigate. See § 2000e-5. However, Commissioner's charges are very rare, as is to
be expected when the authority lies with the most senior official in the Agency. LESLIE E.
SILVERMAN, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 10 (Mar. 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task-reports/upload/

systemic.pdf. My recommendation would expand this system so no such charge would be
needed; all the EEOC would need is reasonable grounds to believe federal antidiscrimination laws have been violated.
313. For instance, the EEOC is currently investigating UPS's policy of prohibiting facial
hair for employees who have contact with the public. Two individuals, in separate cases,
challenged the policy. The EEOC is seeking information that might lead to a class action
lawsuit. See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 136, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2009).
314. See discussion infra Part II.B.5.
315. EEO-1 Form, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeol/eeol_2007-d.pdf (last
visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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in the workplaces. 3 16 While the EEOC is focused on less-tangible
hazards in the workplace, the same concepts can be used to develop its
investigative priorities.
In either of these scenarios, once the EEOC has investigated, if it determines that bringing suit is appropriate, it should be able to do so. The
EEOC currently has this authority, 3 17 so no structural change is necessary
as to the right to bring suit.
However, the current threat of EEOC litigation is insufficient. The
power that the EEOC needs to add to its arsenal is the power to obtain
attorneys' fees and penalties from employers who engage in unlawful discrimination. At present, the EEOC has the power to obtain remedies for
victims of discrimination. 318 These remedies are identical to the remedies
available to victims of discrimination in lawsuits brought by private attorneys. 3 19 Thus, the EEOC's threat of litigation is not likely to be of concern to an employer. In fact, an employer may be less likely to fear the
EEOC litigation units because they are unable to recover attorneys'
fees, 320 which is a significant cost imposed on employers who lose in
claims involving private attorneys. 32 1 In addition, the data on amounts of
recovery indicate that private attorneys recover more money for their clients than the EEOC does. 3 2 2 In sum, the EEOC's threat is of litigation
that costs less than litigation by a private sector attorney.
This situation needs to be reversed. I propose that Title VII be
amended as follows. First, the provision on attorneys' feeS3 2 3 should be
revised to affirmatively allow the EEOC to recover attorneys' fees.
There is precedent for government attorneys to recover attorneys' fees. 3 2 4
Attorneys' fees have been recovered by the Environmental Protection
Agency for government lawyers working on violations of federal environmental laws. 325
Because attorneys' fees are already available to private attorneys representing victims of discrimination, 326 merely adding the EEOC's attorneys' fees onto the recovery will not create the necessary effect. More is
needed. One obvious option is to restructure the EEOC to give it the
power to determine whether discrimination has occurred at the adminis316. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 306, at 3-4 (discussing priorities for conducting programmed inspections).
317. See § 2000e-5.
318. Id.
319. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
320. § 2000e-5(k) (prohibiting the EEOC from recovering attorney's fees).
321. § 2000e-5.
322. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 23.
323. § 2000e-5(k).
324. See United States v. Dico, Inc., 266 F. 3d 864, 876-78 (8th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Chapman, 146 F.3d 1166, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188,
1199-1200 (8th Cir. 1994).
325. Id.
326. § 2000e-5.
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trative level and to order appropriate relief. 3 2 7 This would make the
EEOC more like other administrative agencies, such as OSHA, 3 2 8 and
obviously increase the EEOC's enforcement powers but at a high cost.
However, as one of the main problems noted above is the volume of
claims the EEOC must manage at present, adding an investigative/hearing component to the EEOC seems imprudent given the EEOC's inability to manage its current responsibilities. This leads me to propose a
different solution. In litigation by the EEOC, in addition to the remedies
available to the plaintiff, provision should be made for civil fines to be
levied against the employer, payable to the EEOC. Civil fines are found
in other areas of employment law, such as for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 329 hiring unauthorized workers under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986,330 and violating the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.33 1 Fines and attorneys' fees together would give
the EEOC greater clout when it litigates employment discrimination
claims.
4. Proposal Four: Partneringwith the Federal Courts
The fourth aspect to the restructuring of the EEOC is the development
of a partnership with the federal courts to implement a unique mediation
system. This partnership would be one whereby the EEOC provides mediation services in employment discrimination cases. 332 Under the new
structure of the EEOC, the mediation program would become an option
upon a party filing suit in federal court. Once a complaint is filed, each
party would receive a standard letter informing them of the mediation
option with the EEOC. 33 3 Both parties would need to opt into the mediation session. Having the EEOC provide mediation services would also
help mitigate the impact of the potential increase in the number of employment claims that would need to be adjudicated by the federal courts.
There are also substantive reasons for the EEOC to maintain its mediation role. First, retention of that role would allow the EEOC to still engage in conciliation efforts, which are a part of its mandate under Title
327. This approach was discussed in the 1980s as the federal courts experienced a significant increase in the number of employment discrimination claims. However, even at that
time, the EEOC doubted its ability to undertake this role. See Lynch, supra note 97, at
103.
328. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-60 (2006) (granting OSHA the authority to investigate and
issue citations for violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act and establishing
administrative procedure within OSHA for employers to challenge the citations).
329. Id. § 216(a), (e) (2006).
330. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(c) (2006).
332. The EEOC once suggested that the federal courts should consider greater use of
ADR in employment discrimination cases. See Lynch, supra note 97, at 103. My proposal
would bring together the benefits of ADR with the expertise of the EEOC in discrimination claims to benefit parties, the courts, and the EEOC.
333. This is very similar to the current process at the EEOC. Once a charge is identified as a candidate for mediation, the parties receive an invitation to mediate. Both parties
must agree for the mediation to take place. See Facts About Mediation, EEOC, http://
eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/facts.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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VII.3 3 4 With the demise of its charge-processing role, the EEOC's conciliation efforts would be very limited without the mediation partnership.
Second, the mediation program has been highly successful. The mediation program is significant in scope, with more than 12,000 mediations
conducted in FY 2008.335 This number represents approximately 12% of
all charges received.3 36 Participants report positively on the experience,
with 96% of employers and 91% of employees who used it indicating that
they would use it again. 337 More than 90% of employers who elect not to
use the EEOC's mediation services cite the most important reason for
this decision as being unrelated to the EEOC mediation program; instead, the reason is the employer's perception that the case lacks merit.338
The success rate for the EEOC's mediation program is also quite positive,
with more than 70% of all mediations resolving the claim. 3 39
A third reason to create an EEOC partnership with the federal courts
under which the EEOC would provide mediation services is pragmatic in
nature. If there is an expansion of claims filed in the federal courts due to
the termination of the EEOC's charge-intake program, this mediation
partnership can help offset the increased load.
Governance theory supports this partnership with the federal courts,
based on the idea that cross-governmental collaboration may more fully
address problems than any one federal agency can.3 4 0 While the focus of
governance theory is on collaboration by different agencies to provide
responses more holistically, 341 the theory supports the use of non-traditional approaches to reach a better result for all parties. 342 Given the
strongly positive results that the EEOC has been achieving with its mediation program and the ongoing push toward moving cases from litigation
into ADR, 3 4 3 this partnership has great promise.
5.

ProposalFive: Information Gatheringand Analysis

The fifth aspect to the EEOC's revised structure is an expanded program focusing on obtaining detailed statistical information about the na334. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
335. See EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 through FY 2008, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/mediation/mediationstats.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
336. The EEOC received 95,402 private sector charges in FY 2008. See 2008 REPORT,
supra note 58.
337. See Facts About Mediation, supra note 333.
338. See E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Investigation of the Reasons for the Lack of
Employer Participationin the EEOC Mediation Program, EEOC, http://archive.eeoc.gov/
mediate/study3/chapter4.html (last modified Dec. 2, 2003).
339. This percentage reflects the success rate beginning with FY 2005. The mediation
success rate rose steadily from 65% to 70% from FY 1999 to FY 2004; since FY 2006 it has
remained essentially flat at 72%. See EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 through FY 2008,
supra note 335.
340. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 385-88.
341. Id.
342. See generally id. at 388.
343. See Jones, supra note 140, at 320-323 (former Commissioner of the EEOC noting
the need to increase the use of ADR and congressional agreement to increase the EEOC's
budget to allow for greater use of it).

1276

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

tion's workforce. The EEOC has not required any particular records or
form of recordkeeping of employers under Title VII despite its statutory
authority to do so.344 At present, the EEOC only requires information
from large employers-those with at least 100 employees and those with
at least 50 employees who are government contractors. 3 4 5 These employers must provide an annual EEO-1 report.3 4 6 For each type of position,
which includes categories such as professional, sales, service workers, administrative support workers, the employer must identify the number of
employees by race, ethnicity and sex.3 4 7
The EEOC should focus on this information-gathering power to allow
it to identify indications of systemic discrimination in the workforce. The
EEO-1 has been used for this purpose in the past. 348 However, the information obtained is limited, and, when the form was most recently revised,
the information required was not expanded but limited. 3 4 9
The need for good information is essential to the EEOC's operations.
It is especially important in light of my recommendation that the EEOC
no longer accept charges of discrimination. The EEOC will need to rely
on information generated in these reports in order to identify situations
where systemic discrimination may be occurring. Given the ease with
which information can be obtained, compiled, and submitted, information
should also be gathered from smaller employers so that all employers
covered by Title VII provide at least the basic EEO-1 data.
In addition, the type of information obtained should be expanded beyond the current basics of number of employees by race, ethnicity, and
sex in each job category. The next most-obvious area of information to
include would be employee terminations as well. Other possibilities in344. See EEOC Records to Be Made or Kept, 42 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (2010) (noting that
the EEOC does not require particularized records or recordkeeping); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e8(c) (2006) (requiring that "[elvery employer, employment agency, and labor organization
subject to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed, (2)
preserve such records for such periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as the Commission shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of this subchapter or the regulations or orders
thereunder.")
345. EEOC Requirement for Filing of Report, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2010).
346. See id. Unions file an annual EEO-3 report and state governments file an EEO-4
report; all reports require similar information.
347. The annual EEO report was held to be constitutional and a lawful exercise of
delegated authority by the EEOC in United States v. State of New Hampshire, 539 F.2d
277, 280 (1st Cir. 1976). While that case addressed the validity of the EEO-4 report, the
rationale behind it would encompass the EEO-1 as well. For the sample, blank EEO-1
report, see EEO-1 Form, supra note 315. While the EEO-1 clearly seeks sex and race
information, it is limited in the information on ethnicity and national origin. Employees
have to be categorized as one of the following: White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Native
American, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, or multi-racial.
348. See Commissioner Stuart J. Ishimaru, Remarks at the Meeting on Operations in
Wake of Hurricane Katrina Revisions to EEO-1 Report (Nov. 16, 2005), availableat http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/11-16-05/ishimaru.html (noting the use of the data by
the EEOC and, at times, by the U.S. Department of Justice).
349. See id. at 2 (commenting on the use of the "two or more" race category in the new
form).
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clude (1) data on salaries by race and sex and (2) data on applicants by
race and sex. Here, in the rule-promulgation situation, is the opportunity
to draw upon governance theory to improve over the traditional regulator models of producing regulations. Collaborative efforts in rulemaking
are the touchstone. This would entail the EEOC engaging all partiesthe public, employers, employees, and discrimination law experts-to begin a dialogue on what information would best enable the EEOC to identify and assist employers in eradicating discrimination without being
unduly burdensome on employers, particularly small companies.
Governance theory also suggests that this situation may be one where
flexibility is warranted. Rather than engaging in the typical one-size-fitsall approach, flexibility in application should be given consideration, allowing different information to be provided by different types and locations of employers.35 0 It may be more effective for the EEOC to obtain
different types of information from different employers about different
types of jobs as the types of systemic discrimination vary greatly by industry and also by job type. This area is also one in which enforced selfregulation may be appropriate, where the nation's largest employers,
faced with the potential for the EEOC to mandate significantly greater
information flow from private-sector employers, voluntarily agree to provide substantial information. 351
III.

CONCLUSION

The EEOC has long been criticized about its operations. In order for it
to become an effective agency in the struggle against employment discrimination, the EEOC needs to undergo significant structural changes.
By eliminating the extremely expensive and nearly useless function of
charge processing, significant resources can be devoted to more effective
efforts in combating employment discrimination. Providing meaningful
assistance in developing employer policies and practices will decrease discrimination that charge processing never could. Ferreting out hidden discrimination will be helped by increasing the EEOC's information
gathering abilities and requiring employers to provide more data on employees to the agency. And where discrimination exists because prevention fails, primary responsibility for enforcing the laws needs to reside
with the multitude of private attorneys general. Providing greater access
to mediation in the court process will assist in reducing the burden on the
federal courts. This is not to say that the EEOC should retain no role in
the litigation arena. For significant claims, the EEOC should be involved
in litigation, and, to increase its effectiveness, the EEOC needs to be able
to use increased threats of sanctions that will help it persuade wayward
employers to engage with the agency in remediating unlawful
discrimination.
350. See Lobel, supra note 196, at 379-80.
351. See id. at 388-92.
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